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This paper studies the optimal product design for a linear pricing monopolist. I ask
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A monopolist facing buyers with heterogeneous tastes could sell a single prod-
uct to all consumers, but the fact that different consumers get different surpluses
out of the same goods indicates that there is a room for further surplus extrac-
tion. Instead of selling a single good, the monopolist can differentiate products to
fully maximize its profits. Economists have been interested in this informational
problem that arises when buyers have private information about their types while
sellers do not. In particular, they have been investigating how the quality of the
goods are affected when a seller cannot identify the type of buyer at the time of
selling.
In this paper, I study the optimal product design for a linear pricing monopo-
list. I ask what the profit maximizing strategy for a monopolist is, while making
sure that it is correctly targeting at different types of consumers. Price discrimi-
nation among buyers with private information is referred to as the second degree
price discrimination, where the seller provides incentive for the buyers to differ-
entiate among themselves. I demonstrate in this paper that, when any type of
buyer has a binding incentive compatibility constraint, an optimal menu of a lin-
ear pricing monopolist involves products that distort qualities for both types of
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consumers away from the first best allocations, or the optimal allocations in the
absence of informational asymmetry.
While there is an extensive body of literature that deal with optimal product de-
sign for nonlinear pricing monopolists, there is a gap in the literature that studies
product design linear pricing monopolists. My thesis attempts to fill this gap, by
looking at the quality distortions involved when the monopolist is forced to price
linearly. The primary reason that the second degree price discrimination in linear
pricing case has not been addressed is that, when there is only a single dimension
on which the goods can be differentiated, linear pricing mechanically precludes
product differentiation. (Stiglitz, 1977) But in the light of the fact that most goods
have multiple quality dimensions, this paper reintroduces the possibility of using
product differentiation to target distinct types.
The optimal product design for a linear pricing monopolist is going to involve
quality distortions, just as with nonlinear pricing monopolist case, but with both
types getting inefficient allocations when the incentive compatibility of the either
type binds. I first explain the difference between nonlinear pricing monopolist and
linear pricing monopolist, by explaining market constraints that forces monop-
olists to price linearly, and then approach the more general profit maximization
problem of a monopolist with second-degree price discrimination, by addressing
the two main aspects: incentive compatibility, and profit maximization.
First, let us investigate the market constraints that results in the difference be-
tween non-linear pricing monopolist, and linear pricing monopolist. A monop-
olist is forced to price linearly, if it can neither (i) prevent resale, nor (ii) observe
the total amount purchased by a buyer. For example, consider a monopolist sell-
ing cereals to two types of buyers in the market: buyers with high preference for
sugar, and others with high preference for fiber. The monopolist cannot provide
bulk discounts since if it did, a single buyer would purchase all cereals, and sell
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them at higher prices in a secondary market. The monopolist can neither charge
more for the last few units, since consumers can buy the same cereal at different
stores, or come back and buy the same cereal multiple times without being noticed
by the monopolist. Therefore, the monopolist, when facing secondary market and
non-exclusivity, is forced to price linearly.
Naturally, since linear pricing case involves more mathematical restriction than
nonlinear pricing case, it is convenient to start with nonlinear pricing case to inves-
tigate the source of informational rent and quality distortion, which are two direct
consequences of informational asymmetry in the second degree price discrimina-
tion.
A natural example of nonlinear pricing monopolist would be a monopolist sell-
ing airplane tickets to two types of buyers: rich businessmen, and bargain hunter
vacationers. Businessmen have higher income, and higher willingness to pay for
a better quality seat. Bargain hunter vacationers are willing to forego on seat com-
forts to save extra dollars. The monopolist would be able to price nonlinearly,
because it can prevent resale among buyers by printing the name of the passenger
on the ticket, and because it can observe the total amount of tickets purchased by
a single buyer.
The optimal profit maximizing strategy for a nonlinear pricing monopolist en-
gaging in the second degree price discrimination still involves constraints, namely:
(i) incentive compatibility constraint, and (ii) participation constraint. Incentive
compatibility ensures that a buyer does not have any incentive to deviate from the
product targeted at her; i.e., that the product targeted at her gives her higher level
of utility than the other products that are offered in the market. Participation con-
straint ensures that buyers do not leave the market; that is, the product targeted at
her gives higher level of utility than the utility level she can get from outside the
market. We call a set of products that are offered in the market as ‘a menu’ and say
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that a menu is incentive compatible if every allocation on the menu is such that the
targeted consumer does not deviate, and correctly consumes that allocation.
The optimal strategy for the airplane ticket monopolist is to design a menu that
consists of first-class seats, targeted at the businessmen, and coach seats, targeted
at the vacationers. For such menu to be incentive compatible, the monopolist has to
make sure that businessmen are actually buying first class seats, and not bearing
the low quality coach seats to save spare hundreds of dollars to spend on other
things. In order for the menu to satisfy participation constraints, the monopolist
also has to make sure that both businessmen and bargain hunter vacationers are
getting the levels of utility that they would have gotten from outside the market.
In order to fully motivate the study, and put it into a context, I start by in-
vestigating three different types of markets in the paper before moving onto the
fourth market, which illustrates the main point of my thesis. In chapter 3, I con-
sider a market where monopolist has perfect information. In chapter 4.1, I consider
a market with nonlinear pricing monopolist providing single dimensional goods.
In chapter 4.2, I consider a market with nonlinear pricing monopolist providing
multidimensional goods. Lastly, in chapter 5, after explaining the set up and de-
livering the conventional wisdom in the screening mechanism literature, I turn to
the fourth market where the linear pricing monopolist provides multidimensional
goods to two types of buyers.
The first market, where the monopolist has perfect information, entails stan-
dard results from the principles of economics–more specifically, its efficient alloca-
tions involve maximizing social surplus. Here we derive the notion of the first-best
allocations, which we use as benchmark allocations to see whether the allocations
with informational asymmetry are distorted or not.
The second market, where nonlinear pricing monopolist provides single di-
mensional goods to two types of buyers, follows the model of Mussa and Rosen
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(1978), and is included to illustrate the source of informational rent and quantity
distortion. Specifically, I use this model to demonstrate that the buyer with higher
valuation of the good gets informational rent with first-best allocation, while the
buyer with lower valuation of the good gets allocations distorted away from the
first-best.
The third market, where nonlinear pricing monopolist provides multi-dimensional
goods to two types of buyers, illustrates the point that even if the monopolist can
differentiate goods based on multiple attributes, the standard result from the sin-
gle dimensional case persists– that is, the buyer with the highest valuation of the
good gets the first-best allocations.
In the last market, where a linear pricing monopolist provides multidimen-
sional goods to two types of buyers, we show that there is an additional distortion
that has not been discussed with the linear pricing monopolists, that arises from
the ability of the buyers to buy some of both products in the market without being
observed by the monopolist. I introduce a new type of incentive compatibility con-
straint from Rothschild (2014), which is the linear analogue to the standard incen-
tive compatibility constraint, and which correctly captures the market constraint





In this chapter, we lay out the set up and assumptions of the problem. The mo-
nopolist faces two types of buyers in the market, H and L. The H type consumers
have higher willingness to pay such that the single crossing property holds. The
monopolist can design two products targeted at each type. If the monopolist can
price nonlinearly, the revelation principle applies (Myerson, 1979), and it is suf-
ficient for a profit maximizing monopolist to provide two goods targeted at each
type, QH = (qH , pH) and QL = (qL, pL). If the goods are differentiated on two di-
mensions, two goods are represented by QH = (qH1 ,q
H






If the monopolist is forced to price linearly, however, the standard revelation prin-
ciple is undermined, since the buyers can freely take linear combinations of the
contracts. Nevertheless, we can still refer to the allocations targeted at each type as
QH = (qH1 ,q
H





L), and think about when the contracts would
be incentive compatible.
Consumers have preferences represented by the utility function of CRRA class,
and the heterogeneous tastes of different types of buyers are represented by the
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parameters b1 and b2 as below:









1− γ − pi i ∈ {H,L} (2.1)
Note that U is continuously differentiable, strictly concave, and strictly increasing
in q1 and q2. bH > bL, so the H type will get higher utility than the L type for each
additional unit of the good; i.e., the H type will have steeper utility curve than the
L type. We also assume that γ > 1. 0 < λ < 1 is a proportion of H type consumers
in the market.
We note that although we use the CRRA class of utility function for explicit
exposition and algebraic simplicity of the problem, the main result of the paper
persists as long as preferences are homothetic. (See Lemma 10.) That is, if we are
willing to believe that a buyer demands the same proportion of attributes given
different prices, the result persists even if the ratio of marginal utility with respect
to the attributes of the goods is not constant.
The monopolist wants to maximize profits
max
QH ,QL
Π(QH ,QL) = λ [pH−C(QH)]+ (1−λ) [pL−C(QL)] ., i ∈ {H,L} (2.2)
The monopolist faces constraints when maximizing profits: it has to make sure that
it (1) provides as much utility level as the outside market options, and (2) correctly
targets the products at each type. We assume throughout that there are ‘participa-
tion constraints’ that the utility provided by the i types’ allocation to i types must
exceed the minimum utility U i. Additionally, the monopolist will potentially face
informational “incentive” constraints when it cannot observe the type of buyers at
the time of selling. The nature of these incentive constraints is context dependent,
and we discuss them further below.
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for i ∈ {H,L}. It is worth noting that we only require linearity in the presence of
the multiple types of buyers in the market. With more than one type of buyers, the
additivity of the cost function matters, as well as homogenous of degree 1 property.
However, we note that if there is a single type of buyers in the market, additivity
becomes a trivial issue, and we can regard the cost function to be of more general
form with homogenous of degree 1 property.
C(q1,q2) = ((q1)α+(q2)α)1/α
For the rest of the paper, however, we assume linear cost function even for the







In this chapter, we look at a market where the monopolist has perfect information–
that is, it can (1) observe the type of buyer at the time of selling, and can (2) ob-
serve the total amount purchased by each buyer. Because the market involves no
informational asymmetry between the monopolist and the buyers, optimal (profit
maximizing) allocations are referred to as the “first best” allocations. In this mar-
ket, the buyers get allocations that they would have gotten in the absence of the
other type. In other words, the presence of other types of buyers in the market do
not affect the quality of their goods, since the monopolist can correctly identify the
types of buyers at the time of selling. The first best allocations, or the ‘undistorted’
allocations, are baseline cases against which we compare the ‘distorted’ allocations
in the presence of informational asymmetry in the next chapters.
We first start by looking at the monopolist selling two goods targeted at two
consumers, H, and L. We assume, for simplicity, that arbitrage or resale is not
possible among buyers, so that monopolists can price nonlinearly. Note that these
‘nonlinear pricing assumptions’ are naturally satisfied in the case of perfect infor-
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mation. The monopolist thus solves profit maximization problem with four choice
variables (qH , pH), (qL, pL), where each consumer gets a quantity q at a price p. The
set of the problem follows (2.2), except for the absence of the incentive compatibil-
ity constraints, since the monopolist can identify the type of buyers at the time of
selling in this chapter.
max
{(qH ,pH ),(qL,pL)}
λ (pH−C(qH))+ (1−λ) (pL−C(qL)) (3.1)
subject to UH(qH , pH)−U¯H ≥ 0
UL(qL, pL)−U¯L ≥ 0
C(q1,q2) = c1q1+ c2q2 is linear, thus weakly convex, andU(q1,q2) is given by (2.1).







1− γ − pi i ∈ {H,L} (3.2)
where U is continuously differentiable, strictly concave, and strictly increasing in
q1 and q2. 0 < λ < 1 is a proportion of H type consumers in the market. bH > bL,
so the H type will get higher utility than the L type for each additional unit of the
good; i.e., the H type will have steeper utility curve than the L type.
That the monopolist maximizes the above object function using four choice
variable implies that there are four first order conditions associated with the fol-
lowing Lagrangian:










































These two conditions tell us that, in a profit maximizing allocation, the marginal
rate of substitution should be equal to the marginal rate of transformation. Graph-
ically, this means that at a first best allocation, utility curve is tangent to the iso-
profit curve on a (q, p) plane.
Now we derive heuristically, by similar reasoning, that a profit maximizing al-
location necessarily satisfies ∂Π(pH ,qH )/∂pH∂Π(pH ,qH )/∂qH =
∂Π(pL,qL)/∂pL
∂Π(pL,qL)/∂qL
. This condition has to do
with the monopolist deciding the proportion of resources to put in each type’s pro-
duction to maximize profits. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that at a profit max-
imizing allocation, ∂Π(pH ,qH )/∂pH∂Π(pH ,qH )/∂qH >
∂Π(pL,qL)/∂pL
∂Π(pL,qL)/∂qL
. This means that by serving more
of H type and less of L type, monopolists would be able to increase profits. But
by doing so, ∂Π(pH ,qH )/∂pH∂Π(pH ,qH )/∂qH decreases, and
∂Π(pL,qL)/∂pL
∂Π(pL,qL)/∂qL
increases. There is a contra-
diction, proving that this inequality cannot hold in profit maximizing allocations.
Graphically, this means that the slope at which H type’s allocation is tangent to its
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utility curve and iso-profit curve must be identical to the slope at which L type’s
allocation is tangent to its utility curve and iso-profit curve.
In this chapter, we saw two important properties of the first best allocations: it
is where (i) the utility curve is tangent to the iso-profit curve on a (q, p) plane, and
where (ii) the slopes of the tangents for both types are identical. Figure 3-1 shows
an example of such allocation. The pink iso-cost lines Πi, i ∈ {H,L} are tangent at










Figure 3-1: First best allocation example
As a closing note, and to motivate the next chapter, I briefly discuss how the
existence of informational asymmetry might affect the optimal allocations. Note
that by implementing the allocations {QH ,QL} in Figure 3-1, the monopolist fully
extracts surpluses from both types, thus maximizing its profit. This implemen-
tation is possible with perfect information– that is, if the monopolist can identify
the types of buyers at the time of selling. However, if the types of buyers are
private information not known to the monopolist, then such allocation is not im-
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plementable, specifically because it is not incentive compatible. The H type can do
better by consuming QL instead of QH : it gives them higher utility level. Therefore,
in order to devise an optimal strategy, the monopolist now has to take incentive
compatibility into account, and make sure that the buyers do not have incentive
to deviate from the products targeted at them. In the next chapter, I carry the as-
sumptions of the nonlinear pricing monopolist selling single dimensional good,
where it can prevent resale, and where sales are exclusive. I add in the incentive
compatibility constraint that reflects informational asymmetry between principal
and agent, and discuss the two main characteristics of the optimal menu that are
direct consequences of informational asymmetry: informational rent given to the




Literature Review: Nonlinear Pricing
4.1 Nonlinear Pricing with Single Dimensional Good
In this section, we consider a class of problem involving the monopolist selling
single dimensional goods to two types of buyers, in a market where (1) resale is
preventable, and where (2) the monopolist can observe the total amount of goods
purchased. We follow the canonical one dimensional nonlinear pricing monopolist
model of Mussa and Rosen (1978), while simplifying the types to be discrete rather
than continuous, and using quantity, instead of quality as the attribute that the
buyers care about. We also adopt CRRA class of utility function instead of linear
utility function, in order to make the results across the cases considered in this
paper more comparable. The modifications do not substantively impact the key
results of interest, that while the buyer with higher valuation on the good gets the
efficient first-best allocation, the buyer with lower valuation on the good gets an
allocation distorted away from the first-best.
If the monopolist operates in nonlinear pricing market, where sales are exclu-
sive and where it cannot prevent resale, it can make take-it-or-leave-it offer to buy-
ers, such that the consumers’ utility maximization problem reduces down to ei-
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ther taking the product if it gives them higher utility than an outside option, or
leaving it for an outside option. The revelation principle (Myerson, 1979) applies,
and we can without loss of generality consider directly assigning allocations to the
two types as long as they are incentive compatible and better than the outside op-
tion. The monopolist designs a menu of products {(qH , pH), (qL, pL)} that would (i)
make the consumers be willing to participate in the market, and (ii) make different
types of consumers to self-select themselves into targeted products. The optimal
product design that would maximize profits and successfully price discriminate





s.t.UH(qH , pH) ≥UH (MUH)
UL(qL, pL) ≥UL (MUL)
UH(qH , pH)−UH(qL, pL) ≥ 0 (ICH)
UL(qL, pL)−UL(qH , pH) ≥ 0 (ICL)
As with before, C is weakly convex, and Ui(p,q) = ui(q)− p, where ui(q) = biq
1−γ
1−γ
of CRRA form is strictly concave, given by (2.1). bH > bL, so the H type will get
higher utility than the L type for each additional unit of the good. 0 < λ < 1 is a
proportion of H type consumers in the market.
The minimum utility constraints MUH and MUL ensure full participation of the
H type and the L type consumers respectively, where the right hand side of the
constraints refer to the level of utility that the buyers can get by leaving the mar-
ket. The incentive compatibility constraints ICH and ICL ensure perfect competitive
screening such that no buyer is willing to deviate to a product other than her own.
Let us now turn to the graphical framework. (See Figure 4-1.) The x-axis rep-
26
resents quantity, and the y-axis represents both utility that consumer gets and the
price that consumer pays. The fact that y-axis represents both utility level and
price reflects the fact that the monopolist fully extracts consumer surplus when it
engages in perfect screening: if the price is lower than the utility, the monopolist






Before moving on, it is worth noting two things about the way the graph is
drawn. First, consumers get higher utility as the allocations move to lower right.
Secondly, as a corollary, feasible allocations that satisfy minimum utility constraints
will lie lower right to the minimum utility curve.
Let us look at what each of the constraints in the profit maximization problem
refers to. We first start with the minimum utility constraints, MUH and MUL. The
aforementioned implication of minimum utility, that it is the borderline between
buying and not buying the product, indeed calls for two notable corollaries: (i)
that it is always going to be the case that one of the minimum utility binds, and
(ii) that any type whose minimum utility does not bind gets informational rent, in
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the presence of informational asymmetry. To illustrate the first point, let us sup-
pose, by way of contradiction, that neither of the minimum utility constraints bind.
Then the monopolist would have incentive to increase the both types’ prices by the
same amount without changing quantities. This movement increases profits, and
is feasible when both MU ’s are slack, since the incentive compatibility constraints
are still satisfied. Consumers are going to take the product as long as the allocation
lies to the bottom right of the minimum utility curve. 1Thus, the monopolist can
raise price until one of the minimum utility constraint binds.
We now consider the second point. With nonlinear-pricing monopolists, the
graphical representation of incentive compatibility constraint is going to be the
indifference curve on which the targeted allocation lies. The H type incentive com-
patibility constraint says that QL must lie above and to the left of H’s indifference
curve through QH . Figure 4-2 represents feasible allocations {QH ,QL} such that the
allocations lie on each type’s minimum utility curves. Given these allocations, the
incentive compatibility constraint of the H type is UH , and that of the L type is UL.
We note, however, that the allocation QL lies to the bottom right of H type’s indif-
ference curve. What this means is that the H type gets more utility from buying QL
than buying QH , or equivalently,UH(qH , pH)−UH(qL, pL)< 0, thus violating incen-
tive compatibility constraint ICH . We see that, by considering the utility curve of
the H type that goes through QL, the H type gets utility level of U ′H by buying QL,
and getsUH by buying QH . Clearly,U ′H >UH , so the H type has incentive to deviate
from its targeted product when presented with a menu {QH ,QL}. In fact, closer in-
spection gives that H type consumer would always have incentive to deviate unless
1One might wonder, why the monopolist would not provide allocations such that both of the
minimum utility curves bind. After all, it seems like the most effective way to fully extract con-
sumer surplus, thus maximizing profit. It turns out that such strategy always turns out to be in-
centive incompatible. In the end, if only one type’s minimum utility binds, the other type ends up
getting informational rent, which is a rent that she derives from having private information that is
not revealed to the monopolist. In order to price discriminate the two types, the monopolist would
have to provide this type with sufficient rent so that she does not have any incentive to deviate
from her own product.
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H type’s allocation lies on U ′H .
We have now established the second point, that any type whose minimum util-
ity does not bind gets informational rent. In other words, informational asym-
metry prevents the monopolist from fully extracting each type’s reserve utilities
when they are different. (UH ̸= UL.) If we assume that UH < UL, then it is al-
ways going to be the case that minimum utility constraint of the L type consumers
binds, while that of the H type consumers is slack. Intuitively, this means that
the L type consumers are always going to be indifferent between buying and not
buying the product, while the H type consumers are going to be strictly better off
by buying the product. In fact, we can quantify the exact amount by which the H
type consumers are going to be better off, which isU ′H−UH . To see the implication
more clearly with figures, we suppose that the monopolist fixes quantity and only
adjusts price. Then the amount by which H type is going to be better off, or the in-
formational rent, can be represented by the length of the green line (See Figure 4-2),
or equivalently, the amount by which the price decreased for the same quantity.
In other words, informational rent is something that monopolists provide to the H
type consumers such that they do not have incentive to deviate from their targeted
products.
Now that we have discussed the implications of participation constraint and in-
centive compatibility constraint, we turn to the profit maximization problem of the
monopolist. We ask: how does the monopolist pin down the optimal allocation of
q’s and p’s? After all, even if we do impose minimum utility constraints and incen-
tive compatibility constraints, the monopolist still faces infinite amount of bundles
on the iso-utility curves to choose from. The standard result from the principles of
economics, of course, implies that the monopolist sets marginal revenue equal to
the marginal cost. That is, they choose bundles on the indifference curves that are









Figure 4-2: informational rent in green
monopolist the same amount of profits. In other words, if the monopolist moves
allocations by adjusting p’s and q’s such that the resulting allocations give exactly
the same amount of profits as before, the old allocations and the new allocations
must lie on the same iso-profit curve. From the previous chapter, we saw that the
first best allocations lie on the tangency of the utility curve and the iso-profit curve.
However, in the presence of informational asymmetry, the first best allocations are
not going to be optimal.
Specifically, we are going to look at how profit maximization involves distor-
tion in quality for one, and only one type of buyer. Consider allocations {QH ,QL}
for each type, such that they are first best for both types, and such that they satisfy
both incentive compatibility constraints and participation constraints. The monop-
olist can always do better by moving L’s allocation away from the first best, thus
creating “distortion”. In Figure 4-3, moving the point labeled QL down and to the
left along L’s indifference curve to Q′′L has two effects: (1) it lowers profits from
the L types, and (2) it eases the binding H type incentive constraint. Since the H
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type earned positive rents (i.e., has a non-binding minimum utility constraint) at
the original allocation, the second effect allows the monopolist to raise the price of
the H type contract without violating incentive compatibility, which raises profits
from the H type. So there are two profit effects: the direct effect from (1), which
decreases profits on L types, and the effect from (2), which increases profits on H
types. The key observation is that, for small distortions in L, the second effect is
larger. Intuitively, this is because, by assumption, allocation L was “first best" and
thus locally profit maximizing. So a movement of size ε only effects profits on L to
second order in ε. But because the H type indifference curve through L is steeper,
this same movement eases the H type incentive constraint to first order in ε, so the
profit from the second effect is first order in ε. The exact amount of surplus by
which monopolist additionally extracts by taking such action is represented by the
blue line in Figure 4-3.
We conclude the section by looking at the example of the monopolist selling air-
plane tickets, and see intuitively how the results apply. The monopolist faces two
types of buyers in the market: rich businessmen who cares more about comfort
than money, and thrift bargain hunter vacationers who would forego seat com-
fort to save on dollars. The optimal strategy of the monopolist involves designing
two products targeted at each type–first class seats for the businessmen, and coach
seats for the bargain hunter vacationers. The problem that the monopolist faces
from such product differentiation is that businessmen might have incentive to de-
viate from first class seats, and bear through the coach seats to save spare hundreds
of dollars to spend on other things. In order to prevent this from happening, mo-
nopolist would deliberately distort the quality of the coach seats down to scare
businessmen away from buying coach seats. Monopolist can then raise the price
of the first class seats further, thus fully extracting the surplus of the businessmen













Figure 4-3: Increase in Profit by Distortion
4.2 Nonlinear Pricing with Two Dimensional Good
We have seen the sources of informational rent and quality distortion involved in
the optimal product design for a nonlinear pricing monopolist providing single
dimensional goods in the previous section. In this section, we look at the nonlin-
ear pricing monopolist’s products when the goods have multiple attributes. The
main purpose of presenting the nonlinear pricing case is to compare and contrast
it with the linear pricing case in the next chapter. To do so, we extend the previous
single dimensional model, and lay out the exposition in the simplest way possi-
ble. The results from canonical nonlinear multidimensional screening literatures
suggest that the optimal strategy for the nonlinear pricing monopolist providing
multidimensional goods involves only one type who puts the highest value on
the good gets the undistorted, first-best allocation. (Armstrong and Rochet, 1999)
In multidimensional screening, there will be a new dimension of distortion. The
purpose of this section is not to pin down the optimal product allocation in the
nonlinear pricing case, but to demonstrate that, as in the single dimensional case,
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no distortion on at least one boundary of the type space persists.
To motivate this section, consider the monopolist selling airplane tickets to rich
businessmen, and thrift bargain hunter vacationers, as in the previous section. Al-
though in the previous section, we considered overall comfort of the seats as the
attribute that measures quality of the product, we can also see that quality, instead
of being a one-dimensional thing, could be thought of as consisting of two things
that buyers might care about. For example, flyers might care about food and drink
quality as well as comfort of seats. And it could be the case that bargain hunter
vacationers care more about food quality, and businessmen might care less about
food quality, because they are sleep deprived, and are going to sleep through the
flight anyway. This means that to satisfy incentive compatibility, the monopolist
can distort both dimensions of quality, and we intuitively expect the monopolist
to distort seat comfort more than it distorts food quality, since the degradation of
seat comfort dissuades businessmen more effectively.
It turns out that the optimal strategy involves the monopolist deliberately de-
grading the seat comfort while increasing food quality by a little bit for the vaca-
tioners, and serving the first-best quality to the businessmen. Let us see intuitively
how this is so. We illustrate the intuition with Figure 4-4. The x-axis represents
food and drink quality, and the y-axis represents seat comfort. We assume that
both types get allocations of the same price, to omit the price axis for simplicity.
As we will see later, this assumption does not affect the main result. UB is the indif-
ference curve of the businessmen and likewise, UV is the indifference curve of the
vacationers. The pink rays, rB and rV , that go through the origin are ‘undistorted
rays’ on which the first best allocations lie for each type. Profit is maximized on
these rays for each utility level. We prove the mathematics for the graph shortly
after illustrating the intuition with this example.













Figure 4-4: Airline monopoly with two dimensional good.
ket. Then the monopolist would be able to correctly identify the type of buyer at
the time of selling, and the optimal allocation would be the first-best allocation,
lying on the straight undistorted ray. The monopolist would be providing seat
comfort, and food and drink quality that would make vacationers just as willing
to buy tickets, thus providing the minimum utility level. Now, suppose that there
are also businessmen in the market, in addition to the vacationers. Businessmen
have their own undistorted seat design ray rB, which is comprised of allocations
that maximizes monopolist’s profits, just as in vacationers’ undistorted ray rV . The
ray for businessmen is steeper than that of vacationers, since businessmen care
more about seat comfort than food and drink quality. If the monopolist can cor-
rectly identify the type of buyer at the time of selling, then it could sell QB and
QV , which are on the undistorted rays of each type, since it’s where the profits are
maximized. However, since coach seats are way cheaper, businessmen might bear
through coach seats to spend spare hundreds of dollars on other things. And since
the monopolist cannot observe the type of buyer at the time of selling, it faces the
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problem that businessmen might deviate from the first-class seats and buy cheaper
coach seats. So the monopolist wants to make coach seats less desirable, but it
doesn’t want to make coach seats more expensive, while holding quality constant,
because it might prevent vacationers from entering the market at all. So, instead,
it wants to lower the quality of coach seats.
Suppose that the monopolist reduces both seat comfort and food and drink
quality for coach seats, from QV to Q′V . This movement would of course prevent
businessmen from buying coach seats, but it can also prevent vacationers from
buying coach seats since they are getting lower utility per dollar than their mini-
mum level. So to make sure that businessmen are not buying coach seats, and that
vacationers are not leaving market, the monopolist would decrease seat comfort
of coach seats, while increasing food and drink quality by a little bit. (QV → Q′′V
in Figure 4-4.) By doing so, it can provide the same level of utility per dollar for
vacationers, thus making sure that vacationers do not leave the market; also, it
prevents businessmen from buying coach seats. Increase in food drink quality for
coach seats would not be able to compensate for the decrease in seat comfort, since
businessmen care more about seat comfort than food and drink quality. So indeed,
we get distorted quality for one and only one type of buyer, in this case, coach
seats for vacationers.
Let us abstract away from the example, and prove the intuition with math-
ematics. In the nonlinear pricing case, monopolists can still prevent resale and
observe the total amount of goods purchased, and therefore can make a take-it-or-
leave-it offers to consumers. The only feature that is different from the previous
section is the multi-dimensionality of the products. What this means is that the
monopolist now has three control variables–price, first characteristic, and the sec-
ond characteristic–as opposed to two that it had before. The problem could be
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λ(pH−C(qH1 ,qH2 ))+ (1−λ)(pL−C(qL1 ,qL2)) (4.2)
s.t.UH(qH1 ,q
H
2 , pH) ≥UH (MUH)
UL(qL1 ,q
L
2 , pL) ≥UL (MUL)
UH(qH1 ,q
H
2 , pH)−UH(qL1 ,qL2 , pL) ≥ 0 (ICH)
UL(qL1 ,q
L
2 , pL)−UL(qH1 ,qH2 , pH) ≥ 0 (ICL)
λ ∈ (0,1) is the proportion of H type consumers in the population, known to the
monopolist. The minimum utility constraints MUH and MUL ensure full partic-
ipation of the H type and the L type consumers respectively, and the incentive
compatibility constraints ICH and ICL ensure perfect competitive screening such
that no buyer is willing to deviate to a product other than her own.
Intuitively, screening is possible in this case with similar results as before. More
specifically, the L type consumers, whose minimum utility constraint binds, are
going to have an allocation distorted away from the first best efficient allocation,
and the H type consumers are going to get their first best allocation.
To illustrate the result, we develop a graphical framework for the setting. (See
Figure 4-5.) The fact that the monopolist can work with three control variables calls
for three axes to represent all the feasible allocations. We put the first attribute of
the good q1 on the x-axis, and the second attribute q2 on the y-axis. There would
be a third axis projecting out that represents price, but we can omit it, and assume
holding price fixed. This does not matter, because we are going to illustrate, by
way of contradiction, the sub-optimality of first best allocations, to show that op-
timal allocations are distorted. Since price is fixed at an arbitrary level, we will es-
tablish that the undistorted allocation cannot be optimal for any price. As with the
previous section, consumers have utility functions of CRRA class, that are concave
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with respect to the two attributes of the good. The heterogeneity of the consumers
is represented by different slopes of the utility curves. In order to talk about qual-
ity distortions away from the first best, it is useful to characterize what the first







Figure 4-5: Nonlinear pricing with two dimensional goods.
The first best allocation refers to the allocation that would have been opti-
mal had there been no informational asymmetry between monopolist and buyers.
Graphically, it is the allocation where iso-profit curves are tangent to the indiffer-
ence curves, as was the case with the single dimensional goods, or equivalently,
where the iso-cost curves are tangent to the indifference curves.2 More explicitly,








2Note that in the previous chapter, we said that the first best allocations are where the utility
curves are tangent to the iso profit curves. Here, we are good with using iso-cost curves, since we
are assuming holding price fixed.
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The utility function U is given by (2.1):









1− γ − pi ∈ {H,L} (4.4)




















Since c1,c2,b1,b2 are constants, we see that the ratio q1/q2 is constant in the first
best allocations. Thus, the first best allocations can be represented by a straight ray
through the origin. These rays are represented by the pink lines in Figure 4-5.3
We further note that in Figure 4-5, as with Figure 4-2, the minimum utility con-
straint of L type binds, and that the incentive compatibility constraint of H type
binds. In the previous section with single dimensional good, this resulted in in-
formational rent for H type and quality deterioration of L type product. In the
multidimensional good case, the results are going to be analogous. To see this, we
observe that the menu {QH ,QL} in Figure 4-5 violates the necessary conditions for
the optimal strategy. Note that as with the previous case, moving L’s allocation
along its indifference curve by an infinitesimal amount does not affect the profits
in the first order, since iso-profit curve is tangent to UL at QL. This is represented
by a movement from QL to Q′L in Figure 4-6.
As with before, H type consumers, who were previously indifferent between
3Figure 4-5, due to dimensional constraint of the graph, assumes the case where the optimal
products have the same price. But even if prices are different, the result that L type’s product is
distorted down persists as long as the H type has shallower indifference curves everywhere, and
the preferences are represented by CRRA utility function that is quasi-linear in price.
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buying QH and QL, become strictly better off by buying QH to Q′L. This creates
further scope for the monopolist to extract surplus from the H type. Note that
the monopolist can do so, through three channels. It can increase the price of the
H type product, decrease qH1 , decrease q
H
2 , or use some combination of the three.
Then monopolist will decrease qH1 and q
H
2 until H type consumers become indiffer-
ent between buying new allocation Q′H and Q′L. Therefore we see that profit maxi-
mizing screening mechanism for multidimensional products also involves L type’s
allocation being distorted away from the first best. In fact the this is analogous to
the standard result from Armstrong and Rochet (1999) for multi-product nonlinear
pricing, which indicates that all ‘high-type’ consumers (whose incentive compati-
bility constraint binds) are served efficient quantities, while ‘low-type’ consumers










Figure 4-6: Nonlinear pricing with two dimensional goods.
In this chapter, we have seen that in both single dimensional, and two dimen-
sional cases, the optimal product design for a nonlinear pricing monopolist in-
volves undistorted allocation for the ‘high type’ buyers whose incentive compati-
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bility constraint binds, and distorted allocation for the ‘low type’ buyers whose in-
centive compatibility constraint is slack. The first section deals with nonlinear pric-
ing monopolist designing single dimensional good, and demonstrates the sources
of informational rent and distortion in quality for the low type. The second section
looks at the nonlinear pricing monopolist designing two dimensional good, and
shows that the main result from the single dimensional case persists: that is, the
high type gets undistorted allocation, while the low type gets distorted allocation.
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Chapter 5
Linear Pricing with Multidimensional
Good
So far, we have studied the equilibria under two assumptions: (i) that the monopo-
list can prevent resale, and (ii) that it can observe total amount of goods purchased
by a consumer. In fact these two assumptions are precisely the market character-
istics that make the monopolist be able to price non-linearly. Airplane seats and
hotel rooms, where the buyer has to identify his or her identity at the time of buy-
ing, are good examples of markets with nonlinear pricing firms with monopoly
power. We now relax these two assumptions and study what the equilibrium looks
like, under the assumptions that the monopolist can neither (i) prevent resale, nor
(ii) observe total amount purchased by a consumer. The first assumption is rather
straightforward–it allows for the existence of secondary market where consumers
can resell the goods that they have purchased before at a price other than monopo-
list price. This rules out scope for bulk discounting for the monopolist, for if there
is a bulk discount, one consumer will buy the goods and redistribute them at a
secondary market. The second assumption implies that there is a scope for buyers
to come back any time to purchase the same product, without being noticed by
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the monopolist. This rules out bulk surcharges. In a sense, the monopolist tomor-
row is a competitor of the monopolist today, since if the monopolist charges more
for last few units consumers will choose to buy first few units only and wait until
tomorrow to buy first few units again. These assumptions together rule out bulk
discounting and charging more for the last few units, and indeed call for linear
pricing schedule.
Before talking about screening mechanism with linear pricing schedule, it is
useful to note that linear pricing monopolist can only price discriminate between
buyers when it can differentiate goods on multidimensional attributes. This is pri-
marily because the monopolists loses control over at least one variable when the
market constraints impose linear pricing. Since consumers now solve their utility
maximization problems by choosing the number of units to purchase, the monopo-
list loses one of its control variables that were used to design screening mechanism.
To see this, suppose that the monopolist raises the price of a good. With nonlin-
ear pricing, consumers could either take or leave the offer, and cannot buy less of
it. However, with linear pricing, consumers can freely choose to buy less of the
product when price increases. This is precisely why screening is impossible when
the good is single dimensional: consumers, regardless of their types, will always
choose to buy a product that gives higher quantity per dollar. With multidimen-
sional goods, however, even if monopolists lose control over price, they still have
control over at least two variables, which enables them to sort out two types of
buyers with different preferences.
To intuitively see how the differentiated products look like with linear pricing
monopolist, I introduce an example of food monopoly on a desert island. The
example may sound unrealistic, but it is a good example to see how the theory
works, since it captures theoretical exposition in the clearest way. Suppose that the
monopolist sells food rations to people on a desert island, and that there are two
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types of buyers in the island: manual laborers, denoted as the M type, and office
workers, denoted as the O type.
Both manual laborers and office workers need calories and vitamin D’s to sur-
vive, but laborers need more calories for their work outdoors, and office workers
need more vitamin D for their work indoors. Office workers are richer, and have
more dollars to spend on rations. Contrary to the examples we have been looking
at, the monopolist cannot prevent resale, nor prevent multiple purchases. These
assumptions imply that buyers can consume some of both types of rations. They
also force the monopolist to price linearly.
The optimal strategy in the food monopoly involves the monopolist designing
two rations—one for each type, just as in the airline example. The monopolist
would put relatively more vitamin D in the office workers’ ration, and distort the
manual workers’ ration to have too low vitamin D, for the same reason that the
airline company distorted the quality of the coach seats. The results are analogous
to that of the nonlinear pricing airline company up to this point. The difference
is that the monopolist, in this case, will distort the office workers’ bundle to have
too low vitamin D as well, instead of serving them the first-best allocations, as the
airline monopolist did with businessmen. Let us work out the intuition as to why
this might be so.
Just as in the airline case, the informational problem that the monopolist faces
is the office workers buying manual workers’ cheaper rations. In order to prevent
this from happening, the monopolist would distort manual workers’ rations as be-
fore, which partially solves the problem. But there is a new effect here. Suppose
that office workers’ rations are undistorted, and they get plenty of vitamin D’s
with their own rations. Then buying a few vitamin D deprived M rations wouldn’t
hurt very much, so it is likely that they would buy some of M rations, after they
are sufficiently satisfied on vitamin D with their own rations. But if office workers’
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own rations were already somewhat vitamin D deficient, then buying vitamin de-
prived M rations would hurt more. So monopolist can raise prices on O’s rations
and make more profits.
Therefore, if sales are anonymous, and if resale is not preventable, the monop-
olist optimally distorts both types of rations, and in the same direction. Both office
workers and manual laborer’s rations get vitamin D deprived.
Let us put this example in the graphical framework. (See Figure 5-1.) Now we
have calories as x-axis, and vitamin-D’s as y-axis. Office workers’ undistorted ray
is steeper than manual laborer’s undistorted ray, since office workers care more
about vitamin D than manual laborers do. Just as in airline case, profit is maxi-
mized at the undistorted rays, and if the monopolist could correctly identify the
type of buyer at the time of selling, the allocations for both types would lie on the
undistorted rays. Also, just as in the airline case, to scare off office workers from
buying manual laborers’ rations, the manual laborers’ ration is distorted down, to
be vitamin D deficient. The new effect in the linear pricing case is that office work-
ers’ own ration is distorted down to be vitamin D deficient as well. So in the end,
both types’ rations get distorted, and in the same direction.
Let us unravel this result, and see where the difference in the results between
linear pricing and nonlinear pricing are coming from. Recall that the standard
incentive compatibility constraint is represented by the indifference curve itself. In
other words, if a buyer can choose an allocation that lies above her indifference
curve, she has an incentive to deviate. If there’s no such allocation, then she is
good with what she has. This precisely reflects the setting of the nonlinear pricing
monopolist, where buyers cannot buy some of both goods.
However, if buyers can buy n*H/21 goods of their own bundle, and n*H/2 goods
of the other types’ bundle, then the utility curve no longer serves as an incentive











Figure 5-1: Food Monopoly
compatibility constraint. Instead, the correct incentive compatibility constraint to
use in this case would be convexification constraint from Rothschild (2014). Con-
vexification constraint is the linear analogue of the standard ones, represented in
Figure 5-1 by the dotted lines,CCO andCCM. These constraints capture the relaxed
market assumptions that buyers can resell goods, and that they can buy some of
both types of goods. Let us once again abstract away from the example, and prove
the intuition with mathematics.
Suppose that there are two types of buyers H and L in the market with differ-
ent preferences. Monopolist provides a menu of two goods targeted at each type
{QH ,QL} where QH is the good targeted at the H type, and QL is the good targeted
at L type. In the nonlinear pricing context, the revelation principle (Myerson, 1979)
allows us to focus on direct incentive compatible implementation: the monopolist
targets a good for each type, but can only choose incentive compatible targets. In
the non-linear pricing case, we can employ the same basic approach, except that
the new incentive constraints are tighter, to reflect the fact that the buyers can buy
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any amount of a given contract, and, moreover, can also choose to ‘mix’ the con-
tracts. Therefore, we derive indirect utilities that incorporate consumers’ utility
maximization problem, and consider designing a menu {QH ,QL} that is incentive
compatible. Let us first solve consumers’ utility maximization problem.
Buyers have preferences represented by utility function given by (2.1), which is
presented again below:







1− γ −n i ∈ {H,L} (5.1)
U is continuously differentiable, strictly concave, and strictly increasing in q1 and
q2. Price p is normalized to 1. n measures the number of units that the buyers buy.
Heterogeneity of buyers is represented by two parameters, b1 and b2. b1 mea-
sures preference for the first attribute of good, and b2, likewise, measures prefer-







. This will ensure that
the H type’s indirect indifference curves are shallower than L type’s indirect indif-
ference curves. Buyers have strictly concave homothetic preferences with constant
relative risk aversion. Concavity of preference with respect to q1 and q2 ensures
diminishing marginal utility, homotheticity ensures that the buyers of the same
type demand same proportions of goods given prices, and constant relative risk
aversion ensures constant ratio of marginal utility with respect to attributes of the
good. The constant ratio of marginal utilities will turn out to be very useful, as it
leads to the first best allocations lying on a straight ray from the origin.
Without loss of generality, a given linearly-priced contract can be defined as
the vector (q1,q2) of quantities per dollar spent on the good. For buyers who are
‘forced’ to buy one and only one good, the choice they can make is to choose the
quantity n of that good that they wish to purchase. Consumer’s utility maximiza-
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tion problem then becomes maximizing (5.1) with respect to n. Solving the first






Plugging it into the original utility function, we get indirect utility function in
terms of q1 and q2:





Notice that n does not enter into the utility function anymore once buyer has solved
utility maximization problem. SinceU(n*q1,n*q2) = γ1−γn
*(q1,q2), it is immediately
implied that the points on the same indifference curve in (q1,q2) space are also
points of equal n*. This allows us to analyze the problem in the (q1,q2) plane using
indirect utilities.
We note that indifference curves have convex shape on (q1,q2) plane, and that
changing n does not affect the shape of the indifference curve. We can prove this by
proving concavity of V with respect to q1 and q2, and that the indifference curves
have convex shape follows as an immediate corollary.
Lemma 1. V (q1,q2) is concave with respect to q1 and q2.
































































































γ−2 (b1q1)−γ−1(b2q2)−γ−1 < 0















































< 1 since γ > 1 by as-
sumption.
Before stating the profit maximization problem of the monopolist, we note that
in the linear pricing case, the difference in assumptions from the nonlinear pricing
case translates into a different set of market constraints. In particular, the canon-
ical incentive compatibility constraints ICH and ICL no longer serve their roles as
market constraints in the linear pricing case, since the ability of the buyers to freely
take linear combinations of the contracts undermines their functional forms. To see
what the new consumer utility maximization problem could do to the canonical
incentive compatibility constraint, and to recognize the need for a new incentive
compatibility constraint, we look at Figure 5-2. Let us show, by way of contradic-
tion, the inaptness of canonical incentive constraints heuristically. Suppose that
the allocations QH and QL are profit maximizing optimal allocation designed by
the monopolist. We see that QH and QL clearly satisfy the canonical incentive com-
patibility constraints, as for each type, the allocation of the other type lies on or
to the lower left to her indifference curve. However, this menu of allocations is
not feasible with linear pricing, since a buyer of H type could buy bundles such
as Q′H , buy spending
n*H
2 on QH and
n*H
2 on QL.
2 Such an allocation is feasible, since









Figure 5-2: Linear pricing undermines optimum derived with canonical incentive com-
patibility constraints.
the set of feasible allocation is represented by the line segment [QH ,QL]. In fact,
Q′H would give her higher utility than QH , so she clearly has incentive to devi-
ate from her targeted product. We can lay out the mathematics more explicitly
using (5.3). Suppose VH(qH1 ,q
H





















































































































where in the third last inequality the concavity of V (·) is used, and in the second
last equality, the fact that VH(qH1 ,q
H




2) is used. Since buyers can take
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linear combinations of the available products QH and QL to reach allocations like
Q′H , allocations such as QH and QL are not incentive compatible in the linear pricing
context. In order to solve the problem such that no type has incentive to deviate,
the monopolist would need a different set of incentive compatibility constraints
that take these consumer decisions into account. Intuitively, we need to ensure
that neither type has an incentive to move ‘towards’ the other type’s allocation.
The correct incentive compatibility constraints to use in this case is the convex-
ification constraint from Rothschild (2014), that addresses this problem directly
by including every possible linear combinations of the allocations in the incentive
compatible sets. Figure 5-3 shows a feasible allocation QH and QL, under convexi-









Figure 5-3: Convexification constraint
Suppose that an H type consumer, as in the previous paragraph, tries to take a
linear combination of the two allocations QH and QL, in the hope that she would
arrive at an allocation Q′H that gives her higher utility than QH that is targeted at
her. We see that whichever combination she takes, it is going to lie on or to the
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lower left of the convexification constraint CCH . In fact, if the allocations QH and
QL were solutions to the profit maximization problem, it would be implemented
without any type deviating from the product targeted at her, which would result
in the monopolist successfully engaging in second degree price discrimination. We
thus have the following lemma:
Lemma 2. A direct allocation QH , QL is incentive compatible in linear pricing if and only


















1 −qL1)+ bL2u′L(bL2qL2)(qH2 −qL2) ≤ 0 (CCL)
We prove this lemma to establish that this is the correct incentive compatibil-
ity constraint to use, and then consider profit maximization problem using this
constraint. To prove this lemma, we consider a movement along the line segment
between QH and QL and check whether it is incentive compatible or not. To for-
malize, fix QL on a (q1,q2) plane, and consider any line through QL. Then fix any
QH ̸= QL on that line and let any point on the [QH ,QL] segment be noted by QH(ε)
where 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1 so that QH(0) = QH and QH(1) = QL. Define Vˆ (ε) = V (q(ε)). We
first prove a lemma that Vˆ (ε) is strictly concave.
Lemma 3. Vˆ (ε) is strictly concave.
Proof. We need to show that ∂
2Vˆ






















































Noting that ∂q1(ε)∂ε and
∂q2(ε)
∂ε are constants, we see that the second term is negative,
and the first term is negative as long as 1γ −1< 0, or γ> 1. 3 Thus ∂
2Vˆ
∂ε2 < 0, and since
the choice of ε was arbitrary, Vˆ (ε) is strictly concave everywhere.





















1−γ] 1γ−1 [bH1 (bH1 qH1 )−γ(qL1−qH1 )+ b2(b2q2)−γ(qL2−qH2 )]
and








1−qH1 )+ bH2 u′H(bH2 qH2 )(qL2−qH2 ) ≤ 0
Therefore, to claim that incentive compatibility is satisfied if and only ifCCH holds,
it suffices to show that incentive compatibility is satisfied if and only if Vˆ ′(0) ≤ 0.
Lemma 4. H is optimal on the line segment (Vˆ ′(0) ≤ 0), if and only if CCH is satisfied.
Proof. If Vˆ ′(0) > 0, then for a small enough ε, H type prefers (1− ε)qH + εqL to qH ,
so incentive compatibility fails. If Vˆ ′(0)< 0, then by quasi concavity ofV , anything
on the line segment is worse than qH . Thus incentive compatibility is satisfied. If
Vˆ ′(0) = 0, then since the set of {q|V (q) > V (qH)} is strictly convex, any point on
the line segment lies outside of the set, so H type has no incentive to deviate. Thus
incentive compatibility is satisfied.
Now that we are equipped with the correct incentive compatibility constraint to
use in the linear pricing case, we can use this to solve profit maximization problem
of a linear pricing monopolist. Profit maximization problem that the monopolist
solves can be stated more formally as follows:
3In fact, the same result would hold for γ ≤ 1. In other words, concavity of Vˆ (ε) doesn’t matter
for the convexification constraints to be valid. The necessary condition is that Vˆ (ε) is single peaked,








Figure 5-4: Illustration of Lemma 4.
max
Qi,pi


















1 −qL1)+ bL2u′L(bL2qL2)(qH2 −qL2) ≤ 0 (CCL)
ui(qi) ≥ U¯i, i ∈ {H,L} (MUi)
λ ∈ (0,1) is the proportion of H type consumers in the population, known to mo-
nopolist. The minimum utility constraints MUH and MUL ensure full participation
of consumers. Contrary to the nonlinear pricing problem, incentive compatibility
constraints are represented by the convexification constraints CCH and CCL, which
prevent buyers from convexifying, or taking linear combinations of the goods of-
fered in the market.
The monopolist faces a linear cost function, which is weakly convex. Weak
convexity of the cost function, together with strict concavity of the utility function,
ensures unique solution to the profit maximizing problem in the absence of infor-
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mational asymmetry. We choose functional forms of utility function as (5.1) and
linear cost function as below:
C(nq1,nq2) = c1nq1+ c2nq2 (5.4)
C is weakly convex, and increasing in q1, and q2.
We first identify the first-best allocations, and analyze quality distortions in-
volved in the optimal allocations, in the presence of informational asymmetry.
The first best allocations lie on a straight ray through the origin, and is defined
by (4.5), with the utility function and the cost function defined by (5.1) and (5.4).
The derivation is repeated nevertheless, for convenience. Suppose that there is one
type of consumer in the market, and that there is no informational asymmetry be-




n* [1− (c1q1+ c2q2)]
where price is normalized to 1, and C is defined as above. The solution to this




Since n* is constant along an indifference curve, we can treat it as constant and take




















This has two important implications: (1) A ray on (q1,q2) plane that goes through
the origin with slope r* characterizes the first best allocations; (2) given a utility
level, profit is maximized at the undistorted ray. I refer to the ray of first best
allocations "undistorted ray" throughout. The second point seems redundant in
the view that r* is what we got from solving the first order conditions, but it could
be used to establish the following result.
Lemma 5. Points on the undistorted ray solve the first best problem of maximizing profits
subject to a given utility level.
Proof. That the allocations on the rays are profit maximization points to each utility
level is established, so we only need to show that it is unique. To establish unique-
ness, we note that the indirect indifference curve is convex, and fixing n, iso-costs









Figure 5-5: Illustration of undistorted rays on which the first best allocations QH
and QL lie.
We have just looked at characteristics of the first best undistorted allocations
for a linear pricing monopolist. When there is no informational asymmetry, profit
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maximizing strategy involves implementing the first best allocations for each type,
as noted in the previous chapters. We now characterize an optimal allocation de-
termined by the monopolist in the presence of informational asymmetry. We claim
that at an optimal allocation, it is necessary that both H type’s and L type’s alloca-
tions are distorted down when CCH binds, and that both allocations are distorted
up when CCL binds.
Theorem 1. 1 Let (qH1 ,q
H




2) be the constrained efficient allocation of non-
exclusive linear pricing monopolist. Then this allocation falls into one of the three cate-
gories below:





















Notice that (i) and (ii) consider cases where either CCH or CCL binds, whereas
(iii) considers cases where neither CCH nor CCL binds. In the light of the fact that
the primary incentive for a monopolist to distort allocation comes from the bind-
ing incentive compatibility constraints of the buyers, it is natural to see that the
first best allocations get implemented when neither of the incentive compatibility
constraints bind. Since both CCH and CCL are slack in this case, moving alloca-
tions away from the first best does nothing but hurting profits. The interesting
cases, where the distortions are involved, are the cases (i) and (ii) where incentive
compatibility constraint of each type binds.
Since (i) and (ii) are qualitatively analogous, I only prove (i) here. (ii) could
be proved by a symmetric argument. (i) says that if CCH binds and CCL is slack,






< rL. We establish this by the following four steps. Step 1: Show that
QL is below and to the right of QH . Step 2: Show that QH is below the undistorted
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< rH . Step 3: Show that QL is strictly below the undistorted ray rL.




Step 1 (Lemma 6): Let us first establish Step 1, that QL is below and to the right
of QH . By the way of contradiction, suppose that an allocation QL is above and
to the left of QH ; we will show that such allocation is not feasible.4 Because the
indifference curve for the L type is steeper than that of the H type, and indifference
curves are convex, when QL is above and to the left of QH , it must either be the
case that (i) CCH binds and CCL is slack, (ii) CCL binds and CCH is slack, or (iii)
both CCH and CCL are slack. We consider each case one by one. If CCH binds and
CCL is slack, then QL is not incentive compatible for the L type buyers since QH lies
inevitably outside of incentive compatibility zone of the L type, due to the slope
of CCL being steeper than that of CCH . (See Figure 5-6 (a).) Similarly, if CCL binds
and CCH is slack, then QH is not incentive compatible for the H type buyers, since
QL lies outside of incentive compatibility zone of the H type. Thus the H type has
incentive to deviate to QL from QH . Let us next consider the last case where neither
of the convexification constraints bind. Then the following two things must both
be true: QH lies below and to the left of CCL, and QL lies below and to the left of
CCH . But it is immediately noted that they cannot both be true, sinceCCL is always
steeper thanCCH when QL lies above and to the left of QH . Figure 5-6 (c) illustrates
that when QH lies below and to the left ofCCL, it cannot also be the case that QL lies
below and to the left ofCCH . We thus have established that all of the three possible
cases that might arise when QL lies above and to the left of QH are not feasible.
There is a contradiction, thus it must be the case that QL lies below and to the right
of QH at all times.
From Step 1, we established that feasible allocation involves QL being lower
4Note that the result of this step holds generally, and that we do not assume anything about
CCH orCCL binding in this step, contrary to other following steps, where we assume that one of the
























(c) Both CCH and CCL slack.
Figure 5-6: Illustration of Step 1 Proof.
right to QH . We now assume throughout thatCCH binds, and show that both types’
allocations are distorted at an optimal allocation. To achieve the results, we con-
sider small movement in H type allocation and/or L type allocation and see what
it does to the Lagrangian for the monopolist’s problem. The monopolist has to
consider five factors when making such movement: change in profit, change in
convexification constraint, and whether the minimum utilities of the two types are
still satisfied. Thus the Lagrangian is defined as
L = λΠH(QH)+(1−λ)ΠL(QL)+µΛ(QH ,QL)+ζΓ(QL,QH)+φ(UH−U¯H)+τ(UL−U¯L)
where Λ(QH ,QL) is CCH , Γ(QL,QH) is CCL, λ is the fraction of the H type in the
population, and µ ≥ 0,ζ ≥ 0,φ ≥ 0,τ ≥ 0 are Lagrange multipliers associated with
the profit function, CCH , CCL, MUH , and MUL respectively.
Step 2 (Lemma 7): We next establish Step 2, that if CCH binds at an optimum
allocation, QH must be below the undistorted ray, or
qH2
qH1
< rH . To proceed, we




≥ rH and consider the effect of a small
movement of (qH1 ,q
H




not bind, a small movement along CCH towards L’s allocation weakly improves




> rH , profit is improved as H type’s allocation moves towards
the first best allocation lying on rH , and if
qH2
qH1
= rH , profit is not affected to first
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order by the movement. Thus, λ∇ΠH(QH) ≥ 0. Next we see how the movement
makes CCH slack, or µ∇Λ(QH ,QL) > 0. Consider a small movement of QH along
the indifference curve. Then minimum utility constraint is not affected in the first
order because the movement is tangent to the constraint, but CCH becomes slack
as the slope becomes shallower and L type’s allocation becomes strictly below to
the left of CCH . (See Figure 5-7.) If CCL does not bind, then a small movement in H
does not affect CCL. If CCL does bind, then a small movement in H does not affect
CCL to first order, because the movement is tangent to the indifference curve and
thus along CCL. Therefore, the value of the Lagrangian strictly increases with this




is not optimal. Thus when CCH binds, the optimal H type allocation is distorted













Figure 5-7: Illustration of Step 2 Proof.
Now that we have established that H type’s allocation is always distorted when
CCH binds, we now look at L type’s allocation and see whether it must get dis-
torted, and if it does, where it lies with respect to the first best allocation. To show
60








< rL, one at a time. Step 3













show that it is inconsistent with an optimum. To establish this, we first show that





≥ rL, the monopolist can always do better by making small movement of the
L type’s allocation towards rL.
Let us first show that an allocation where CCL binds and
qL2
qL1
≥ rL is not feasi-
ble. If both CCH and CCL bind, it means that they share the same slope and that
convexification constraints are represented by a single line on which QH and QL
lie. So the question boils down to whether CCH and CCL sharing the same slope is
feasible for QH and QL lying ‘inside’ the undistorted rays. It is clearly not feasible:
homothetic preferences indicate that the slopes of CCH and CCL are constant along
the undistorted rays. Furthermore, since the indifference curve of the H type is
shallower than that of L type, the slope of CCH is shallower than the slope of CCL
on the undistorted rays. Note as we move QH and QL ‘inwards,’ the slope of CCH
becomes shallower and the slope ofCCL becomes steeper. They can never be equal





allocation involves CCL not binding.




≥ rL and CCL does not bind, is
suboptimal. From Figure 5-8(b), let us consider a small movement of QL along L




and ∇ΠL(QL) = 0 when
qL2
qL1
= rL.5 The minimum utility constraint for the L type
does not get affected in the first order. Since Q′L is below to the left of the con-
vexification constraint of the H type, CCH becomes slack, and it follows that this
5This means that the profit is increasing(∇ΠL(QL) > 0), or locally constant (∇ΠL(QL) = 0) with























(b) Step 3 (ii): CCL does not bind
Figure 5-8: Illustration of Step 3 Proof.
movement increases the Lagrangian, thus such allocation cannot be an optimum.
This completes the proof of Step 3.
So far, we have concluded everything about the locations of optimal QH and QL
on (q1,q2) plane: QH lies below and to the right of rH , and QL lies below and to the
right of rL. That is, both types’ allocations get distorted to the lower right when
CCH binds. We finally say something more about incentive compatibility of the L
type on this allocation and conclude our proof. Step 4 in the next paragraph shows
that if CCH binds and
qH2
qH1




In other words, CCL cannot bind at such allocations.
Step 4 (Lemma 9): We next show that CCL must be slack at any optimum in






< rL. We sup-
pose that CCL does bind, by way of contradiction. From Figure 5-9, suppose the
monopolist makes a small movement of L type’s allocation towards rL. Then it
clearly improves profit as the allocation becomes closer to the undistorted ray, or
the first best allocation. Next we look at whether the convexification constraints













Figure 5-9: Illustration of Step 4 Proof.
tion of the movement is tangent to CCH , which has the same slope as CCL when
both convexification constraints bind. CCL, however, becomes slack as L’s alloca-
tion moves towards rL. QH , which used to lie onCCL, now lies strictly below and to
the left ofCCL due to the small movement. Therefore this increases the Lagrangian,
and such allocation cannot be optimal. Thus it must be that CCL does not bind at
such allocations.
We have thus fully established that in the optimal product design for a linear
pricing monopolist, allocations get distorted for both types in the same direction





The main implication of this paper is that, when the monopolist facing different
types of buyers in the market can neither prevent resale nor observe the total
amount of goods purchased by each buyer, the optimal product design involves
the monopolist distorting the products for both types of buyers in the same di-
rection. While the literatures on the canonical nonlinear pricing monopolist sug-
gest that efficient screening involves providing undistorted first-best allocation to
one and only one type of buyers who have the highest willingness to pay for a
good given quality when single crossing property holds, the ability of the buyers
to choose the number of units to buy, in the linear pricing case, further encourages
the monopolist to distort the quality of the highest type’s good to ensure that the
highest type does not have any incentive to deviate from her own product. The
result suggests that inefficient distortions are more pervasive with linear pricing,
when buyers can freely buy some of both goods, than otherwise.
There are two main restrictions in the analysis. First, most of the proofs are
executed by imposing specific functional forms on the utility function and the cost
function. As for the utility function, although the nice algebraic properties of the
problem mostly come from the properties of CRRA utility function, we note that
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the main result persists as long as the preferences of the buyers are homothetic. The
more restrictive assumption is the linearity of the cost function, which is assumed
mainly because of the need for additivity when dealing with multiple types of buy-
ers. The simplicity of the exposition makes the application a non-trivial problem,
but it nevertheless renders a useful insight as to why the linear pricing monop-
olist would have an incentive to deliberately degrade the quality for both types
of buyers in the market when it cannot observe the types of buyers at the time of
selling.
Another big restriction implicit in the analysis of this paper is the two-type
assumption. However, as long as single crossing property holds, the same basic
analysis using consistency constraints would apply with more preference types,










Proof. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exists a feasible allocation such
that q1L ≤ q1H and q2L ≥ q2H where L is above and to the left of H. Then it must
either bind atCCH , orCCL or not bind at all. To arrive at contradiction, we proceed
by ruling out each case. Before moving on, note that the following inequality holds












where the first inequality follows from the fact that the utility curve of L type is




from the assumption that L is above and to the left of H. This in-
equality will come in handy when we derive contradiction for each case discussed
below. Suppose first that CCH binds. Once we rule out this case, the case where
CCL binds gets ruled out by symmetry. With CCH binding, we have
u′H(b1Hq1H)(b
H






















































, which contradicts (A2). We checked that if L is above and to the left of H, then
CCH cannot bind. By a symmetric argument, CCL cannot bind at such allocation.




1 q1L−bH1 q1H)+ u′H(b2Hq2H)(bH2 q2L−bH2 q2H) < 0 (A4)
u′L(b1Lq1L)(b
L
1q1H−bL1q1L)+ u′L(b2Lq2L)(bL2q2H−bL2q2L) < 0 (A5)
















































This also contradicts (A3). Therefore, all allocations such that q1L ≤ q1H and q2L ≥
q2H are not feasible, which means leads to the conclusion that any feasible alloca-







Now establish step 2 by ruling out H such that q1Hq2H ≥ rH . Let the Lagrangian for
the problem be
L = λΠH(QH)+(1−λ)ΠL(QL)+µΛ(QH ,QL)+ζΓ(QL,QH)+φ(UH−U¯H)+τ(UL−U¯L)
where









1−bL1qH1 )+ u′L(b2Lq2L)(bL2qL2−bL2qH2 )
λ is the fraction of H type in the population, and µ ≥ 0,ζ ≥ 0,φ ≥ 0,τ ≥ 0 are La-
grange multipliers associated with the profit function, CCH , CCL, MUH , and MUL
respectively.





























Lemma 7. In any optimal allocation in which CCH binds,
qH2
qH1
< rH . That is, H type’s
allocation is below and to the right of the undistorted ray.
Proof. By applying (D1) to the Lagrange equation, we get
∇ICHL = λ∇ICHΠH + µ∇ICHΛ(QH ,QL)+ ζ∇ICHΓ(QL,QH) (A6)
We can look at two possible cases, whereCCL does not bind, and whereCCL binds.




≥ rH is not
an optimum. We proceed by looking at the terms on RHS individually. First,
λ∇ICHΠH is weakly positive, by Lemma 5 and the assumption that
qH2
qH1
≥ rH . Next
we look at µ∇ICHΛ(QH ,QL). It can be proven that this term is always greater than
zero.

















































































































By Lemma 6, qH1 −qL1 < 0 and qH2 −qL2 > 0, which gives ∇ICHΛ(QH ,QL) > 0.
Next, we look at the third term ζ∇ICHΓ(QL,QH). If CCL does not bind, ζ = 0,





≥ rH is not an optimum. Consider instead the case where CCL binds. Then
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ζ ̸= 0 and we need to look at ∇ICHΓ(QL,QH).


























































































is not an optimum in general.
By Lemma 7, we have ruled out this candidate for H type allocation where
qH2
qH1




< rH . We proceed in two steps. First, we
establish thatCCL cannot bind when
qL2
qL1
≥ rL(Step 3). And then we rule out the case
where CCL binds at
qL2
qL1
< rL (Step 4). We first establish the first half of Step 3:
Lemma 8. If CCH binds at an optimal allocation and
qL2
qL1
≥ rL, then CCL cannot bind.













































* , and since uL is concave, u′(x) is decreasing
































































































































Corollary 1. In any optimal allocation in whichCCH binds,
qL2
qL1
< rL. That is, L’s allocation
is below and to the right of undistorted ray.
Proof. By Lemma 8, we established that if CCH binds at an optimal allocation and
qL2
qL1
≥ rL, then CCL cannot bind. We can further rule out the case in which CCL does
not bind to establish the corollary. First order condition is given by
−∇ICLL = − [(1−λ)∇ICLΠL+ ζ∇ICLΓ(QL,QH) + µ∇ICLΛ(QH ,QL)]





ζ= 0 since CCL is slack. CCH binding indicates, µ ̸= 0, while the movement makes
Λ(QH ,QL) > 0. Thus, the first order condition does not hold, so such allocation
cannot be an optimum.
Lemma 9. IfCCH binds and
qH2
qH1




Proof. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that CCH binds at
qH2
qH1





< rL. Then we can suspect that a movement of L’s allocation along its
indifference curve towards the first best allocation would improve profits. The first
order condition that reflects this idea is
∇ICLL = (1−λ)∇ICLΠL+ ζ∇ICLΓ(QL,QH)+ µ∇ICLΛ(QH ,QL).





< rL, and the third term is zero in the first order. It is then sufficient to show
that the second term is positive (non-negative) to establish that such allocation
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1−bL1qH1 )+ u′L(bL2qL2)(bL2qL2−bL2qH2 ))
)











































From (A7) and Lemma 6, we have ∇ICLΓ(QL,QH) > 0. Therefore CCL cannot bind





Lemma 10. With linear pricing, utility maximization problem can be reformulated with
indirect utilities of iso-n’s if preferences are homothetic.
Proof. Suppose u is homothetic. Then there exists a function h such that
u(nq1,nq2)) = h(F(nq1,nq2)) (11)
where F(nq1,nq2) is a homogeneous of degree 1 function. Then
∂u
∂n
= h′(nF(q1,q2))F(q1,q2) = 1
h′(h−1(V *))(h−1(V *)) = n
Where V *(q1,q2) ≡ u(n*(q1,q2)q1,n*(q1,q2)q2). Then it follows that points on the
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